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Administrative costs per participant appear to vary widely across pension funds in different 
countries. These costs are important because they reduce the rate of return on the 
investments of pension funds, and consequently raise the cost of retirement security. 
Using unique data on 90 pension funds over the period 2004–2008, this paper examines 
the impact of scale, the complexity of pension plans, and service quality on the 
administrative costs of pension funds, and compares those costs across Australia, Canada, 
the Netherlands, and the US. We find that, except for Canada, large unused economies of 
scale exist. Analyses on a disaggregated level confirm economies of scale for small and 
medium pension funds. Even though the pension funds in the sample are among the 
largest in the world, further cost savings appear to be possible. Higher service quality and 
more complex pension plans significantly raise costs, whereas offering only one pension 
plan reduces costs, as does a relatively large share of deferred (or sleeping) participants. 
Administrative costs vary significantly across pension fund types, with differences 
amounting to 100%. 
 
Keywords:  Pension  funds;  Administrative  costs;  Scale  economies;  Service  level; 
Complexity; Optimal scale. 
 
JEL classification codes: G23. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Pension reforms, which have been at the center of the policy debates for many years, have gained even 
more urgency as a result of the credit crisis. Retirement savings are one of the most important assets 
for the majority of people in developed countries, and a well-functioning, low-cost system is therefore 
crucial. Although there is no consensus on what constitutes an optimal pension system, most 
policymakers acknowledge the importance of cost efficiency in pension provision. Even small 
differences in administrative costs can have a large impact on the net rate of return on pension 
contributions. Costs directly affect the extent to which the intended objective of providing adequate 
income for retirees can be attained. For example, an increase of one percentage point in annual 
charges on assets results in a reduction in future pension benefits of 27% after 40 years of 
contributions (Bateman and Mitchell, 2004). Although studies on investment costs as well as 
administrative costs incurred by pension funds are available, their number is limited in comparison to 
their topic’s importance. 
 
Administrative costs deserve greater research scrutiny, since they account for a very large portion of 
operational costs (Mitchell, 1998). However, difficulties in specifying the correct pension fund 
production function and the limited availability of data have hindered detailed empirical work on this 
topic. Moreover, so far empirical studies on economies of scale in pension fund administration have 
ignored service quality and the complexity of pension plans in the cost function. Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (PWC, 2007) argues that smaller funds offer a more expensive albeit more personalized 
service. Besides, customers benefit when they can choose among more flexible, customized, and 
varied services, even though these require a more sophisticated and costly administration. According 
to PWC (2007), differences in administrative costs are due not only to scale economies, but also to 
higher service quality and the more complex underlying business model of smaller funds. Where PWC 
had no data to support their view, our dataset enables us to test this hypothesis. 
 
This study uses a unique and detailed dataset for pension funds from four countries, Australia, Canada, 
the Netherlands, and the US, covering the period 2004–2008, to shed light on a number of important 
questions related to administrative costs. First, we explore whether economies of scale in pension fund 
administration exist. If this is the case, pension fund participants can benefit from increasing the 
operational scale of pension funds, thereby lowering average administrative costs. A related question 
is whether the cost–size relation is concave, that is, whether an optimal scale exists with economies of 
scale for smaller pension funds and diseconomies of scale for larger ones. Second, we analyze the 
impact on administrative costs of service quality and the complexity of the pension plan. Third, we 
assess cost differences across pension fund types and pension plan types, pointing to possible 
systematic inefficiencies. Fourth, we explore cross-country differences and quantify the possible `  3 
effects of institutional differences on costs, while controlling for a variety of factors. Finally, we focus 
on each of the specific disaggregated administrative operations and assess whether economies of scale 
are present, to establish where scale upgrading would realize the largest benefits. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the 
administrative costs of pension funds, with particular emphasis on cross-country comparisons. Section 
3 discusses and compares the main institutional features of the pension system in the four countries in 
our sample. Section 4 describes the dataset, reveals characteristics of pension funds, and explores the 
relations between administrative costs, pension plan complexity, and service quality on the one hand 
and size on the other. Section 5 presents the models used in the empirical analysis for two pension 
fund output measures, and discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 recapitulates and draws 
policy recommendations. 
 
2.  Review of the literature 
 
Administrative costs include all costs to operate the pension fund except investment costs, that is, 
personnel costs, costs charged by third parties, rent, depreciation, and so on. The administration of 
pension funds includes record keeping, communication with participants, policy development, and 
compliance with reporting and supervisory requirements (see also Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
Research on pension funds’ administrative costs has focused on a few countries, in particular Australia 
(Bateman and Valdés-Prieto, 1999; Malhotra et al., 2001; Bateman and Mitchell, 2004; Sy, 2007), the 
US (Caswell, 1976; Mitchell and Andrews, 1981), Chile (James et al., 2001) and the Netherlands 
(Bikker and de Dreu, 2009). In all these countries, significant economies of scale were found for 
private pension funds with respect to both membership size and asset management. The main 
explanation is that overhead and other fixed costs (e.g., data management and compliance) can be 
spread over a larger pool of participants as membership size or financial wealth increases. 
Ambachtsheer (2010) stresses the role of operational efficiency in optimal pension provision and 
indicates that more research is necessary on institutional implementation. 
 
Few comparative studies have been done across different countries, and almost none have used a 
multivariate approach. Whitehouse (2002) compares defined contribution (DC) schemes in 13 
countries. For Latin American countries and Great Britain, the author finds no systematic relation 
between pension fund size and charges levied (consisting of costs and profit margins), stating that 
evidence on economies of scale in pension fund administrative cost is inconclusive. In a more recent 
study, Hernandez and Stewart (2008) compare the charge ratios in 21 countries with private DC 
schemes. The authors note that charge ratios tend to be lower in countries with fewer providers, 
thereby concluding that there is some evidence of economies of scale. Tapia and Yermo (2008) `  4 
conduct a similar analysis for countries in which the pension system is based on individual retirement 
accounts: Australia, Sweden, and countries in Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe. 
However, these studies do not distinguish between investment and administrative expenses, and use 
charge ratios or other measures of fees rather than economic costs. James et al. (2001) improve on this 
last issue by comparing fees and administrative expenses (including investment expenses) in six Latin 
American countries with pension systems based on individual retirement accounts. The fundamental 
problem with that body of research is the lack of appropriate data that would allow one to determine 
the relative contribution of each factor in a multivariate analysis. Instead, the authors use broad 
descriptive statistics on the domestic pension system to highlight bivariate relationships. Only 
Dobronogov and Murthi (2005) conduct a multivariate cross-country study, based on a limited number 
of observations, and find some evidence of economies of scale in pension funds in Croatia, 
Kazakhstan, and Poland. 
 
In general, there are large differences in administrative costs among pension funds. Some of them 
reflect particular market conditions or institutional environments, while others are due to different 
degrees of efficiency. Nevertheless, Valdés-Prieto (1994) stresses that a comparison of economic 
efficiency both among pension funds and across countries is only meaningful if the quality of the 
services pension funds offer is accounted for. In his qualitative study of Chile, the US, Malaysia, and 
Zambia, Valdés-Prieto (1994) compares the quality of the national pension systems on broad quality 
dimensions. The author concludes that the variation in service quality across countries might be even 
higher than the variation in administrative costs. Mitchell (1998) indicates that an empirical estimation 
of the impact of service quality on the administrative costs of pension funds is very challenging, since 
it is difficult to measure service quality. This is an important problem, since Chlon (2000) suggests 
that customers value service quality and the provision of information more highly than the charges 
they have to pay. This view was confirmed by PWC (2007) based on a survey among participants. 
 
There may be a difference between the costs that pension funds face and the fees they charge. Since 
pension funds typically do not seek profit, we would expect the two to coincide. However, privately 
run programs operating in imperfectly competitive markets (as, for instance, in the US) may enjoy 
some degree of market power and charge a price higher than production costs. Orszag and Stiglitz 
(2001) note that the distinction between costs and charges has been implicitly ignored by the academic 
literature or assumed to be of little relevance. The dataset in this study contains pure costs. 
 
3.  Institutional setting of pension provision schemes across countries 
 
All countries’ pension systems rely on a three-pillar structure, although this structure is much more 
institutionalized in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands than in the US. In Australia, the first pillar `  5 
is a publicly run system that aims at guaranteeing a minimum income for the elderly. Benefits depend 
on the level of income retirees receive from other sources and are financed from the general tax 
revenue. The second pillar is a compulsory, privately run pension program called the superannuation 
guarantee. This pension program was established in Australia in 1992, when it replaced a voluntary 
retirement system. Since 2002, employers have been required to save at least 9% of their employees’ 
income, though low-earning workers are excluded from contributing. Workers can invest additional 
income in a voluntary third pillar comprising individual retirement accounts. Since the government 
allows employers great freedom to invest in the pension fund of their choice, pension funds differ 
substantially in terms of scale, plan type, form of management, and sponsor type. Plans can be 
acquired in the retail market or offered by the employer and are either single- or multi-employer plans, 
called, respectively, corporate and industry plans. 
 
The pension system in Canada is very similar. The first pillar, created in 1952 through the Old Age 
Security Act, is financed through general taxation and offers a universal flat rate pension. The second 
pillar is a compulsory earnings-related social insurance program. Employees earning above a 
minimum level must contribute 4.95% of their earnings to a centrally administered plan that functions 
as a partially funded system. Employee contributions are 100% matched by the employer. Benefits 
depend on the contributor’s history, and the program aims at a 25% replacement rate based on average 
lifetime salary. The Canadian third pillar comprises voluntary occupational and personal pension 
plans, known, respectively, as occupational registered pension plans and registered retirement savings 
plans. These registered pension plans can be operated under a trust agreement, under an insurance 
company contract, or under government-consolidated revenue funds for public employees. Most 
occupational plans are defined benefit (DB) plans, albeit DC plans are becoming more common in the 
private sector. In 2004, approximately half of the Canadian labor force saved through an occupational 
plan (Antolin, 2008). 
 
In the Netherlands, the 1956 Pensions Act created a first-pillar pay-as-you-go system that entitles 
anyone above the age of 65 to a basic pension. The second pillar is a so-called quasi-mandatory 
system: The government itself does not mandate occupational schemes but, in practice, labor 
agreements ensure that 80% of all occupational plans are mandatory and that more than 90% of the 
employees are covered (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, hereafter OECD, 
2007). Both the employer and the employee contribute to funding. Generally, the employer provides 
around 70% of the pension contributions. A third pillar—encouraged through special tax rules—
allows people to invest in individual pension plans. 
 
The US pension system includes a public pension, Social Security, and a means-tested Supplemental 
Security Income for low-income retirees. Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system financed through `  6 
a 12.4% payroll tax equally shared between employee and employer. The Supplemental Security 
Income is financed through the general government budget. Apart from mandatory payroll 
contributions to Social Security, there is no compulsory occupational or individual pension scheme. 
The government only mandates minimum standards for pension fund operations contained in the 1974 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act and subsequent amendments. Employers or groups of 
employers are free to set up pension plans for their employees according to their own preferences. In 
the past, most plans were DB in nature, but today most of them are either DC or a hybrid. One popular 
plan is the 401(k) scheme, under which employees can retain part of their earnings in an account often 
partially matched by employers. Lastly, individual accounts known as Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs) offer an additional vehicle to save for retirement. Voluntary plans are subject to contribution 
ceilings as well as special tax provisions that encourage savings. At the end of 2005, voluntary 
occupational pension schemes covered approximately 143 million participants, while individual plans 
covered 51 million participants (OECD, 2009b). 
 
The institutional features of these four systems differ widely. First, while participation in an 
occupational scheme is mandatory in Australia and Canada, and, in practice, also in the Netherlands, it 
is not in the US. Second, average replacement rates are much higher in the Netherlands than in the 
other countries, although Canada has comparable rates for low-income retirees. Moreover, the 
replacement rate is flatter under the Dutch system than in the three other countries, where the rate 
declines faster for higher incomes. Antolin (2008) argues that the mandatory nature of a program and 
its generosity are important factors in determining participation in a voluntary pension plan. For 
instance, the enrollment rate in voluntary plans in the US is high, since the second pillar is not 
compulsory and public pensions are relatively meager. Furthermore, the combination of a quasi-
mandatory second pillar and high targeted replacement rates makes the Netherlands one of the few 
countries—with Australia—in which the total assets of second pillar pension funds exceed 100% of 
the annual gross domestic product (hereafter GDP; see Table 1). Lastly, in terms of operating 
expenditure, there is variation among the four countries. As shown in Table 1, operating 
expenditures—which includes both administrative and investment costs—are smaller in Australia than 
in the other countries. However, these figures should be taken with caution, because costs are difficult 
to define uniquely across countries. Furthermore, for some countries, these figures fluctuate heavily 
over time. 
 
All in all, we observe that the pension sector differs widely across countries, a finding that holds to a 
lesser degree also for the second pillar, where the pension funds operate. The US deviates from the 
other countries because they provide three different pension provision schemes in the first two pillars. 
Furthermore, the second pillar is mandatory in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, whereas in the 
US it is not. `  7 
 
Table 1. Pension fund industry overview by country (OECD global pension statistics)
a 
Country    2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Assets to GDP (%)  Australia  71  80  90  110  92 
  Canada  48  50  54  62  51 
  Netherlands  108  122  126  138  114 
  US  74  74  79  79  58 
Contributions to GDP (%)
b  Australia  7.23  7.81  8.80  15.98  9.74 
  Canada  2.30  2.24  2.57  2.56  2.15 
  Netherlands  4.64  4.97  4.44  4.26  4.02 
Operating costs to assets   Australia
d,e  0.31  0.30  0.28  0.27  0.30 
(%)
b,c  Canada  0.85  0.64  0.72  0.28  1.38 
  Netherlands  0.77  0.79  0.61  0.55  0.51 
Total number of pension   Australia
d  1,785  1,323  872  575  505 
funds
b  Canada  3,816  3,816  5,036  5,036  n.a. 
  Netherlands  843  800  768  713  n.a. 
a The data exclude non-autonomous pension funds (book reserves). 
b No data available for the US. 
c Operating costs include both administrative and investment expenses. 
d Including corporate, industry, public sector, and retail pension funds, but excluding small APRAs and SSFs (APRA, 2008). 
e Operating costs include administrative expenses only. 
 
4.  Dataset 
 
Our dataset was provided by CEM Benchmarking (CEM) and contains 90 different second pillar 
pension funds from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the US.
4 This dataset is based on self-
reported expenses rather than charges, and thereby circumvents some of the empirical problems 
mentioned in Section 2 on the literature review. The pension funds in our sample have an incentive to 
reveal accurate and truthful information to obtain targeted consulting and benchmarking. Our 
observations are from the period 2004–2008, resulting in an unbalanced panel with 254 observations. 
As shown in Table 2, the US accounts for 49 different pension funds and approximately two-thirds of 
the overall observations, including all first-year observations. For each pension fund, we have 
observations on the following: administrative costs, split into 24 cost categories (see the Appendix); 
the number of participants, split into three types, depending on their employment status; the number of 
pension plans; and information about service levels and complexity. The market value—that is, total 
assets—of the pension fund assets is missing for a number of pension funds, reducing the number of 
observations by one-quarter. 
 
Our dataset is a non-random sample with respect to the overall population of pension funds, since 
CEM deals only with those pension funds that subscribe and pay for its benchmarking services. Our 
sample is small in terms of pension funds (compare Tables 1 and 2), but these pension funds are large 
in terms of participants, three (Australia) to 30 (Netherlands) times larger than the average pension 
                                                 
4 CEM Benchmarking Inc. is a Toronto-based global pension benchmarking firm, focussing the objective 
measurement of the investment performance, service levels and costs of pension investments and administration. `  8 
fund, covering 5% (Australia) to 85% (the Netherlands) of all participants.
5 Inferences about the 
overall pension fund industry would be inappropriate, and we instead assume that, at most, the sample 
is representative of the population of large pension funds in these four countries, restricting any 
conclusion to this particular set. Hence, one should recognize that the sample may suffer from 
selection bias.  
 
Table 2. Sample observations of pension funds across countries and time 
The column labeled All refers to the number of pension funds, while the Assets column refers to the number of 
pension funds that also provide their total assets.  
Australia  Canada  Netherlands  US  All countries   
All  Assets  All  Assets  All  Assets  All  Assets  All  Assets 
2004  –  –  –  –  –  –  31  12  31  12 
2005  9  0  8  4  9  5  28  15  54  24 
2006  5  0  11  7  12  11  34  31  62  49 
2007  10  9  12  10  12  12  41  41  75  72 
2008  3  3  3  3  0  0  26  26  32  32 
Total  27  12  34  24  33  28  160  125  254  189 
Proportion to 
sample (%)  11  6  13  13  13  15  63  61  –  – 
Number of 
pension funds  10  9  13  11  17  15  49  46  90  81 
 
Table 3 provides pension fund characteristics by country. Monetary variables—namely, administrative 
costs and total assets—have been converted in euros at purchasing power parity (using OECD 
weights) to adjust for cross-country differences and changes in the relative value of a currency. 
Furthermore, they are expressed in 2005 prices to account for inflation. The average pension fund in 
the sample has approximately 400,000 members and holds 35 billion euros in assets, corresponding to 
over 90,000 euros per participant. Four pension funds hold assets in excess of 100 billion euros, that 
is, more than the annual GDP of most countries. Australian pension funds tend to be smaller in all 
dimensions, while the average Canadian pension fund has fewer members but more assets per 
member. The average Dutch pension fund is more than twice as large in terms of membership. 
 
Pension funds in the Netherlands, as well as in the US, tend to be among the cheapest, with average 
yearly administrative fees of, respectively, 69 and 64 euros per participant. Canadian and Australian 
pension funds are, on average, the most expensive, with sample means of 87 and 97 euros per year, 
respectively. Administrative costs as a percentage of total assets in Canada and the US are low, 
whereas those in the Netherlands are higher. These figures are, incidentally, all considerably lower 
than those usually found in studies of pension funds (see Section 2). As indicated above, the sample is 
biased toward the larger pension funds in each country. Compared to other countries, Dutch pension 
funds have much more deferred or dormant participants who are no longer employed and not yet 
retired. This is probably due to the structure of mandatory pension schemes: Employees cannot 
                                                 
5 The smallest pension fund of our sample counts 13.000 participants. `  9 
choose, so changing jobs often implies changing pension funds. Nowadays, workers can transfer 
their pension rights to a different pension fund, but this has not always been the case in the 
past. 
 
Table 3. Weighted averages of pension fund characteristics by country 
Country averages are over observations. An alternative is to average first over observations by pension fund, 
obtaining pension funds characteristics, and second over pension funds. If the second step is replaced by taking 
weighted averages, with the number of observations as weights, we again obtain country averages over 
observations. 
  Australia  Canada  Netherlands  US  All 
Entire sample  N=27  N=34  N=33  N=160  N=254 
Number of participants (1000s)   128   242  818  393  400 
Administrative costs per part. (euros)   97  87   69  64   71  
Share of active participants (%)  54   60   37   55   53  
Share of deferred participants (%)  24   7   45   18   21  
Share of pensioners (%)  23   33   18  27  26  
CEM complexity score
a   0.1  -0.4   -0.4   0.2   0  
Arithmetic average complexity score
a  -0.5   -0.2  -0.7  0.3  0  
Principal comp. complexity score
a  -0.4   -0.7  -0.8  0.4  0 
Subsample I  N=23  N=17  N=33  N=156  N=229 
CEM service score
a  -0.6  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0 
Arithmetic average service score
a  -0.4  -0.7  0.1  0.2  0 
Principal complex. service score
a  -0.1  0.3  -0.2   0.0  0  
Subsample II  N=12  N=24  N=28  N=125  N=189 
Total assets, on average (billion euros)  5  32  41  36  35 
Asset per participant (1000 euros)   61  132   72  93  93 
Administrative costs per asset (%)  0.25  0.08  0.19  0.07  0.10 
a All service and complexity scores reported here are standardized to allow for comparisons across the three measures. Thus, 
the overall sample mean is zero by construction. Note that not all 12 service measures are available for all 254 observations. 
For some observations the service score is an average over fewer underlying components. For this reason, the service scores 
are based on that smaller number of observations (see subsample I). 
 
For 75 pension funds, Graph 1 presents 2007 figures of administrative costs against size in numbers of 
participants, both expressed in logarithms. Cost per participant ranges from 19 to 415 euro per annum, 
while size varies from 13 thousand to 2.7 million participants. The graph suggests a negative 
relationship between average costs per participants and size. Pension funds from the Netherlands 
(indicated by N) are among the largest ones, followed by those from the US (U), as observed also 
from Table 3. Furthermore, pension funds in these countries are among the most efficient ones. At the 
other end, we find Australian pension finds (A) typically to be smaller and with higher cost, while 
those from Canada (C) take an intermediate position. 
 `  10 
Graph 1. Administrative costs against size of 75 pension funds (in logarithms; 2007) 
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The dataset includes unique information on the service quality and the business model complexity of 
its pension funds. The benchmarking company defines service as “anything a member would like, 
before considering costs.” Twelve variables capture several dimensions of the service quality of 
pension funds, such as timeliness in pension payments, amount and personalization of information, 
and services to employers of occupational funds. Each variable is the weighted average of finer and 
more precise measures (based on measures of activities of pension fund as well as satisfaction surveys 
among participants), and it is expressed on a 100-point scale. Table 4 provides an overview of the 
variables constituting the service quality score, as well as the weights used by the benchmarking 
company to construct an overall service score. 
 
Similarly, 15 different variables describe the complexity of the pension fund’s business model. 
Complexity refers to the intricacy of the rules governing pension payments, customized services, and 
contributions.
6 Complexity variables are calculated as the weighted average of more specific measures 
of complexity, measured on a 100-point scale that increases with complexity. Table 5 shows the 
variables constituting the complexity score, as well as the weights used by the benchmarking company 
to construct an overall complexity score, which is the score used in our analysis. 
 
                                                 
6 The 15 dimensions used to measure complexity are pension payment options, customization choices, multiple 
plan types and overlays, multiple benefit formula, external reciprocity, contractual cost-of-living-adjustment 
rules, contribution rates, variable compensation, service credit rules, divorce rules, purchase rules, refund rules, 
disability rules, translation, and defined contribution plan rules (see the Appendix).  `  11 
Table 4. The composite service score 
  Dimension  Weight (%) 
1  Annuity pension payment  18.9 
2  Pension inceptions (excluding disability pension)  7.9 
3  Pension benefit estimates  5.0 
4  One-on-one member counseling  7.9 
5  Member presentations (group information sessions)  6.7 
6  Member contacts: calls, e-mails, letters  21.5 
7  Mass communication  18.5 
8  Service to employers  4.0 
9  Outgoing pension account transfers (refunds, transfers out, payment termination)  0.3 
10  Incoming pension account transfers  3.3 
11  Assessment of disability pensions  5.1 
12  Disaster recovery  1.0 
 
The service and complexity variables are weighted averages, with the weights being determined by 
CEM analysts. To aggregate the 12 service variables into a single score, seven different criteria were 
employed: feedback from pension fund members (obtained at on-site meetings, symposiums, and peer 
conferences); the relative cost of each activity,
7 the relative volume of each activity, the expectations 
of participants based on external experience, the extent of personalized human contact, the extent of 
participant resource involvement, and whether or not the dimension is related to the core business of 
the pension fund (i.e., generating and administering pension payments). These criteria do not translate 
directly into objective and indisputable weights, but are filtered through the professional judgment of 
several experts who eventually elaborate the weights to be used to summarize the information. 
Although these values are updated every year to incorporate new feedback and past experience, some 
arbitrariness persists, potentially posing a threat to the validity of our analysis. We have no access to 
the original raw data used to compute the 12 dimensions of service quality or the 12 dimensions of 
complexity, but the dataset includes disaggregated data on these variables. To improve the robustness 
of the models, the composite score was calculated using two alternative operationalizations, namely, 
principal component analysis (PCA) and simple arithmetic averages.
8 The latter solution is 
straightforward and results in a 100-point variable, while the former is discussed next in more detail. 
 
The method of PCA involves taking an orthogonal linear transformation of a set of data to reduce a 
large dataset into a lesser number of factors, explaining as much variation in the original variables as 
possible. Because each factor retains the highest variance available, the inevitable loss of information 
in the data reduction procedures is minimized. In this instance, the generally low cross-correlations 
among the original dimensions imply a data structure that is not easy to interpret in terms of a few  
 
                                                 
7 Later we introduce alternative weighting schemes (principal component analysis and equal weighted) that do 
not rely on costs. 
8 An alternative strategy would have employed each of the original 12 dimensions as explanatory variables in the 
final analysis, but the consequent reduction in the number of degrees of freedom available could have had severe 
implications, given the small sample at hand.  `  12 
Table 5. Weights used for the composite complexity score 
  Dimension  Weight (%) 
1  Pension payment options  15.0 
2  Customization choices  20.0 
3  Multiple plan types and overlays  10.0 
4  Multiple benefit formula  16.0 
5  External reciprocity  3.0 
6  Contractual cost-of-living-adjustment rules  4.0 
7  Contribution rates  3.0 
8  Variable compensation  4.0 
9  Service credit rules  3.0 
10  Divorce rules  3.0 
11  Purchase rules  5.5 
12  Refund rules  4.0 
13  Disability rules  6.0 
14  Translation  0.5 
15  DC plan rules  3.0 
 
underlying variables, so that the criteria commonly employed to determine how many factors to retain 
do not lead to a clear solution. During an exploratory phase, the baseline model of administrative costs 
in Section 5 was estimated with several PCA specifications, differing only in the number of service 
and complexity factors retained. Since increasing the number of components did not substantially 
change the rest of the estimation, only the first component of each variable was maintained in the final 
analysis presented in this paper.
9 The CEM and arithmetic average scores for services are higher for 
the US and the Netherlands, whereas the PCA score is higher for Canada. Complexity is, on average, 
higher in the US than in the other countries, but varying with the different measures (i.e., CEM, equal-
weighted, and PCA scores). 
 
4.1. Scale economies 
Table 6 presents average administrative costs for different-sized classes. The upper panel of Table 6 
shows costs in relation to size classes based on the number of participants. The (weighted) average of 
administrative costs per participant falls steadily as the class size increases. The minimum value is 45 
euros for pension funds having between half a million and a million members, reflecting unused 
economies of scale. For bigger funds, on average, the costs are higher. Apparently, scale economies 
exist even for the—on average—rather large funds in our sample. The average of administrative costs 
per total assets (weighted by the number of participants) does not indicate this U-shaped curve 
(although it would if medians were used). The data also present a clearly declining trend in individual 
financial wealth, since the value of individual assets in small pension funds is substantially higher than 
in larger ones. Lastly, it is worth noting that more expensive pension funds do not seem to deliver 
higher service quality. Although there is no clear relation and relatively little variation in service 
scores, the smallest pension funds offer the lowest service quality according to this measure, while the 
                                                 
9 The first component of the PCA of the 12 service variables retains 26% of the original variance, while the first 
component of the PCA of the 15 complexity variables accounts for 21% of the original variance. `  13 
largest pension funds provide the highest. Much stronger is the positive relation between pension fund 
size and the complexity score. 
 
Table 6. Average annual administrative costs of pension funds by size classes 
The upper panel of the table is weighted by the number of pension fund members, while the lower panel is 






































Number of participants (× 1000)             
<50  23 148.5 0.7 62.7 27.3 14 0.157 159.2
50-100  37 82.2 2.7 69.6 24.7 27 0.098 88.6
100-500  125 61.6 32.7 71.6 37.1 94 0.085 87.2
500-1,000  50 44.9 35.2 66.8 36.8 38 0.133 80.3
>1,000  19 55.1 30.3 73.9 40.1  16 0.085 74.1
Total assets (billion euros)   
<10  64 81.4 8.9 71.5 27.7 64 0.115 91.6
10-20  41 52.0 10.6 71.8 34.4 41 0.085 68.5
20-50  44 74.8 19.3 70.6 36.6 44 0.077 106.4
50-100  27 51.3 21.8 73.0 38.2 27 0.052 110.1
>100  13 77.4 18.9 71.9 47.8 13 0.061 130.4
 
The lower panel of Table 6 shows administrative costs in relation to size classes based on total assets. 
The weighted average of the administrative cost per asset again reflects a U-shaped association: Costs 
decline very rapidly when the size class increases, reaching a minimum of 0.05% of total assets for 
pension funds with total assets between 10 billion euros and 100 billion euros (pointing to unused 
economies of scale) before slightly increasing again. The (weighted) average of administrative costs 
per participant, however, does not show a similar shape. These patterns are similar to those for all 700 
Dutch pension funds (Bikker and de Dreu, 2009). Again, the quality of services seems to be 
approximately the same across asset classes, where complexity increases with size. The Appendix 
shows that economies of scale are also present on a disaggregated level, where the costs of most 
categories of administrative activities per participant decline with size. Section 5 uses a multivariate 
model of pension fund administrative costs to further investigate economies of scale. 
 
4.2. Additional number of pension plans and other services 
Table 7 compares the administrative costs for pension funds offering multiple products and services. 
The two upper rows of Table 7 contrast pension funds offering only one type of plan (which is mostly 
DB in the dataset) and those that allow clients to choose between two or three plans. The weighted 
average of administrative costs per participant is 57 euros in the first case and 55 euros in the second. 
On the other hand, costs are higher in the latter instance if expressed as a percentage of pension fund 
assets. Nonetheless, contrary to economic theory and observations elsewhere (Mitchell and Mulvey, 
2004, p. 350), the data suggest that there is little substantial difference in administrative costs for 
pension funds offering more than one type of plan. The complexity score decreases when several plans `  14 
are offered, probably indicating that DB plans are more complicated than DC schemes. Comparing 
pension funds that focus on their core business of providing pension plans versus those that provide 
additional services (such health cost administration, tax deferred savings plans, home mortgages, 
loans, and asset management), we find that the weighted average of the (normal) administrative cost 
per participant does not rise. This is in line with expectation as our ‘normal’ administrative cost does 
not cover cost of additional services. The complexity score increases with additional services, from 33 
to 38, while at the same time service quality also increases considerably, significant at the 1% level. 
Apparently, pension fund members appreciate the provision of supplementary services. 
 
Table 7. Impact of additional number of pension plans and other services 



















ive costs per 
asset (%) 
One  166  56.4  43.1  70.1  126  0.096  Number of 
plans offered  More than one  88  54.2  34.3  70.7  63  0.104 
Zero  48  55.7  32.8  65.1  29  0.095  Additional 
services  One or more   206  54.9  38.2  71.3  160  0.102 
 
5.  Empirical analysis 
 
Section 4 describes bivariate relations between average administrative costs and pension fund size, 
country, service quality, pension scheme complexity, and other pension fund characteristics. This 
section examines the marginal contribution of each variable to total cost through a multivariate panel 
analysis. We use a traditional cost function to explain administrative costs, taking into account, among 
other variables, all the cost determinants considered above. In theoretical frameworks, such a cost 
function relates the total administrative cost of a pension fund to its output volume and input prices. 
Pension funds provide several services, but their key functions are “financing, recordkeeping, money 
management, and benefit payouts” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 3). Defining output is a well-known problem in 
the financial service industry. This paper uses both a narrow and a broad definition of output. The 
narrow measure of output, which will be central in our analysis, is the number of participants. This 
definition assumes that a pension fund’s services are all related to the process of providing pension 
benefits to the fund’s members, covering “financing, recordkeeping and benefit payouts.” This output 
definition is closely linked to the pension fund activities behind our topic of investigations, that is, 
administrative costs. In reality, however, output is multidimensional. Therefore, we use as an 
alternative measure of output the log-linear combination of the number of participants and total assets, 
where the latter is a proxy of “money management” activities. Note that our investigations focus on 
administrative activities and do not regard the performance of investments as such. 
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We start by estimating the impact of our narrow output measure membership size (Participants) on 
pension fund total administrative costs (AC), while controlling for complexity and service quality 
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where j refers to countries, i to pension funds, and t to time. We use logarithms to transform the 
administrative costs and number of participants to reduce the impact of heteroskedasticity, as well as 
enable the measurement of scale economies. The coefficient of the output variable, β, measures 
economies of scale (β < 1) or diseconomies of scale (β > 1) of the administrative activities of pension 
funds. Testing β = 1 is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that administrative costs rise (exactly) 
proportionally with the pension fund size, that is, that economies or diseconomies of scale do not exist. 
To investigate whether scale economies are constant across size classes or not, we also include, as a 
sensitivity test, a squared term of pension fund sizes (i.e., numbers of participants). 
 
The service quality and complexity scores are important control variables, since they correct for 
additional costs due to extra services and tailor-made qualities. These variables are missing from all 
other existing pension fund costs studies. We apply either CEM scores, equal-weighted scores, or 
principal component scores, standardized to enable proper comparisons across the models.
10 We also 
control for the effects of pension fund types, actually their participants’ occupations. Pension funds in 
the sample offer occupational plans for the public sector (national, local, or municipal governments), 
teachers, other school employees (custodians, administrative clerks, and other staff members), 
policemen, firemen, and other employees of public safety agencies, workers covered by a corporate or 
an industry-wide collective agreement, and workers in other occupational categories, such as judges.
11 
These categories are not mutually exclusive, because any pension fund can offer several occupational 
plans. A dummy variable for each type of occupation is included in the model to measure for each 
pension fund, whether or not it has participants working (or who have worked) in the respective type 
of occupation. Furthermore, the proportions of retired and deferred participants are included to take 
into account the impact of membership composition on the relative importance of the services 
performed. For instance, a pension fund with a high proportion of retirees should spend more, all else 
being equal, on annuity payment administration than one with a lower fraction of retirees, while 
sleepers are expected to be least costly, since many administrative activities have ended (e.g., incasso) 
or not yet started (payment of benefits). We also include the number of pension plans (one or more), 
                                                 
10 The standardization is executed any time the sample size changes, so that in every subsample analyzed the 
mean equals zero and the standard deviation is one. 
11 Clearly, most of pension funds deal with public sector employees, but private sector employees are also 
present. `  16 
where we expect a positive coefficient, since additional pension schemes complicate the pension fund 
bureaucracy and internal organization. 
 
A country dummy is included to take care of fixed effects, such as labor market conditions and 
institutional structures, that are peculiar to each country. The US acts as the reference group. Finally, 
εijt is the idiosyncratic error term. Some of the theoretically relevant variables are not available for the 
individual pension funds, particularly input prices such as wages. For small countries such as the 
Netherlands, one might expect wages to be rather constant across the financial institutions. This case is 
less likely for large countries, for example, the US. We have country-wide (real) wages for the 
financial sector at hand, which would take wage differences across countries into account, while 
ignoring domestic differences across pension funds. Inclusion of the national wage levels in the 
model, as proxy for the input price for labor, produces insignificant coefficients
12 We decided to not 
include these input price proxies in Equation (1) for two reasons: (i) our wage price proxy is poor, and 
(ii) our country dummies would anyway absorb the level of such national wage prices (though not 
their eventual changes over time). 
 
All models in this paper are unbalanced panels with random effects specific to pension funds. It is 
common practice to test the validity of this assumption of random effect (versus fixed effects) through 
the Sargan–Hansen test for overidentifying conditions. However, we have a strong economic 
argument not to use the fixed effect model, since pension-fund–specific fixed effects would not so 
much eliminate the effect of disturbing omitted variables (as it should do) but rather wipe out the size 
of the pension fund, disturbing the estimation of economies of scale.
13 This has been tested 
empirically: fixed effects cause a strong downward bias of the output coefficient, strongly 
overestimating scale economies. OLS estimates do not deviate significantly from the random effect 
estimates.  
 
5.1. Empirical results for the narrow definition of output 
Table 8 presents the estimation results for the multi-country and US subsamples, both based on 
Equation (1). In addition, the multi-country model is estimated with individual-country interaction 
effects with output to measure the national extent of economies of scale, using Σkβk (ln Participants × 
Countryijt) instead of β (ln Participants). For the multi-country model, substantial unused economies 
of scale seem to exist (first column). The scale coefficient of the number of participants indicates that 
total administrative costs increase by only 76% when membership size doubles. These potential 
economies of scale of 24% are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Table 8 tests the 
                                                 
12 This outcome occurs also when we would delete the country dummies. Inclusion of the wage levels do not 
affecting the other model parameters. Alternative estimation results are available on request. 
13 Note that we do include fixed effects for countries as well as, in a variant, for years. `  17 
significance of all coefficients (say, β ) against the null hypothesis β = 0 and presents the results with 
asterisks (*). In addition, for the output coefficients, the more relevant tests against the null hypothesis 
β = 1—that is, constant returns to scale (no scale economies)—are performed, where degrees signs (º) 
indicate the significance of the deviation from β = 1. 
 
Table 8. Administrative cost of pension funds explained by a narrow definition of the output 
measure 
The value terms administrative costs (the dependent variable) is converted into euros and expressed at the 2005 
(euro) price level. The asterisks ***, **, and * denote, respectively, significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% 
confidence levels. For the scale variable number of participants, we denote values significantly different from 
one by degree signs (º) instead of asterisks, see the first rows. The Huber–White standard deviations correct for 
heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses. 
  Multi-country sample    US
 a 
  One scale parameter  Country-specific 
scale parameters 
 
Number of participants (in logs), entire sample  ***/ººº0.759 (0.053)    ***/ºº0.809 (0.089) 
Number of participants (in logs) in Australia    ***/ºº0.739 (0.105)   
Number of participants (in logs) in Canada    ***0.945 (0.147)   
Number of participants (in logs) in NL    ***/ººº0.691 (0.069)   
Number of participants (in logs) in US    ***/ººº0.788 (0.089)    
Standardized CEM service quality score  ***0.064 (0.018)   ***0.063 (0.018)  ***0.063 (0.018)  
Standardized CEM complexity score  **0.044 (0.018)   **0.038 (0.017)  **0.056 (0.023) 
Single pension plan offered  -0.128 (0.083)  -0.129 (0.084)  -0.068 (0.088)  
Share of retired participants (%)   -0.002 (0.005)  -0.003 (0.005)  0.005 (0.008) 
Share of deferred participants (%)  ***-0.014 (0.003)   ***-0.014 (0.003)  **-0.012 (0.004) 
Public sector: national government  -0.028 (0.093)  -0.006 (0.096)  0.043 (0.175) 
Public sector: state or provincial government  ***0.631 (0.203)  ***0.728 (0.193)   ***0.808 (0.216) 
Public sector: municipality  **0.106 (0.047)  **0.093 (0.048)  ***0.179 (0.051) 
Collective agreement (CA): teacher  *-0.126 (0.072)  -0.119 (0.073)  **-0.171 (0.085) 
CA: other school employees  0.033 (0.048)  0.026 (0.049)  0.010 (0.050)  
CA: police and other public safety workers  0.048 (0.038)  0.052 (0.038)  0.010 (0.037) 
Collective agreement: other  ***-0.213 (0.076)  ***-0.212 (0.076)  ***-0.249 (0.085) 
Corporate pension fund  -0.071 (0.064)  -0.092 (0.073)   
Industry pension fund  0.036 (0.042)  0.011 (0.048)   
Australian pension fund  **0.349 (0.166)  0.933 (1.559)   
Canadian pension fund  *0.254 (0.136)  -1.599 (1.966)   
Dutch pension fund  ***0.445 (0.133)  1.631 (1.336)   
Intercept  ***7.383 (0.668)  ***7.035 (1.073)  ***6.540 (1.042) 
Number of observations  254  254  160 
χ
2 statistic
b  345.2  354.4  151.6 
R
2, overall  83.7  83.8  83.2 
a The US does not have pension funds in the corporate and industry pension fund categories, and these dummies variables 
have therefore been dropped. 
b Joint significance of coefficients.
 
 
This multi-country output coefficient may hide country-specific scale effects. Therefore, in the second 
column, we estimate a modified version of Equation (1), where the pension fund size in terms of 
number of participants interacts with a country dummy to allow for cross-country comparisons of 
scale efficiencies. This specification assumes that the impact of all variables, except for membership 
size, on administrative costs is the same, regardless of the country in which the pension fund operates. 
Although the validity of this assumption is debatable, the specification is an improvement from the `  18 
baseline model that assumes all relations between the dependent and independent variables to be the 
same. Fully separated country-specific estimates would require fewer assumptions, but are less 
reliable due to the low number of observations for all separate countries but the US. For three 
countries we observe the existence of highly significant scale economies, while for Canada the output 
coefficient is not statistically different from one, indicating that pension funds in this country are 
already operating on an efficient scale. The Netherlands is the country in which potential economies of 
scale remain for the relatively largest part unexploited. The scale coefficient, significant different from 
one at the 99% confidence level, suggests that doubling the membership size would increase costs by 
only 69%, equivalent to potential economies of scale of 31%. This is in line with results found by 
Bikker and de Dreu (2009) for all Dutch pension funds. Similarly, increasing membership by 1% in 
Australia and the US corresponds to an increase in total costs of 0.74% and 0.79%, both of which are 
also significantly different from one at the 99% level. Finally, the last column of Table 8 shows the 
result of analyzing the subsample of only US observations. This exercise confirms the existence of 
scale economies in the US at the 95% level. All three models have also been estimated with an 
additional squared term of the output measure number of participants.
14 All squared terms have a 
positive sign, which is coherent with the hypothesis of a standard convex cost function, but their 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence only, not at the 95% level, and, 
therefore, have been deleted in all presented model specifications. Bikker and de Dreu (2009) did 
observe significant squared terms using a large sample of the entire Dutch pension sector. 
 
With respect to the control variable, we find, as expected, that both higher complexity and service 
quality increase total administrative costs, all else being equal. In all three specifications, they have 
significant and positive effects, respectively, at the 1% significance level (service) and the 5% 
significance level (complexity). This finding supports the obvious view that pension funds delivering 
service of a higher quality are, other things being equal, more expensive. Similarly, pension funds with 
a more complex business model are also more costly. The impact of service quality on administrative 
costs is similar across the various models in Table 8, but the impact of complexity on costs is 
somewhat higher in the US subsample. Offering only one policy plan decreases administrative costs 
by almost 13% in the multi-country model, and by 7% in the US sample, in line with expectations, but 
these effects are not statistically significant. While the percentage of retirees does not significantly 
reduce administrative costs, we observe a significant negative impact of the proportion of deferred 
participants, both multi-country and in the US, in line with expectations. This has also been found by 
Bikker and de Dreu (2009) for the entire Dutch pension sector. 
 
                                                 
14 The results of the alternative estimations, here and elsewhere in this paper, are available on request from the 
authors. `  19 
The nature of a pension fund’s occupational plans is also an important factor in determining its 
administrative costs. Occupational plans covering employees of a state or provincial government or of 
a municipality have additional administrative costs of no less than 60% to 80% and 10% to 20%, 
respectively. On the other hand, collective agreements covering teachers and workers in the “other” 
category decrease administrative costs, on average, by roughly 20%. These relations are strongly 
significantly different from zero in all specifications. Hence, differences in administrative costs across 
pension fund types amount to around 100%. Remarkably, these coefficients in the total sample and the 
US subsample are similar is sign and magnitude, be it that both positive and negative effects are more 
pronounced for the US in all four pension fund types mentioned. Relative (in)efficiency is an obvious 
explanation, but complexity and service quality may also play a role, as far as they have not been 
picked up by the two respective indexes, which, of course, are only general approximations. 
 
Finally, there are also significant country-specific effects on administrative costs. Pension funds in 
Australia, Canadian, and the Netherlands are more costly than those in the US, all other determinants 
taken into account. These country dummies capture a large variety of effects, reflecting both the 
economic and institutional characteristics of the domestic pension fund markets, including (now the 
input prices are not incorporated in the regression) the national wage level (and other input prices at 
the country level), but not their eventual changes over time. However, when we include individual 
country interaction effects with the output measure number of participants, we no longer observe 
statistically significant country effects. Apparently, the dummies do pick up country-specific output 
measurement errors in the constrained model with one multi-country scale effect. The models explain 
no less than around 83% of the variation in the entire sample, as well as in the US sample. 
 
If we replace the CEM scores for complexity and service quality by equally weighted or PCA scores, 
all the results are rather similar in coefficient sign, size, and significance. In fact, the three score 
measures are all mutually highly correlated,
15 implying that they can be employed as substitutes 
without any major change in the model estimation. Using the first component derived from PCA is the 
optimal choice from a statistical point of view, because it can account for most of the variance in the 
original set of variables. On the other hand, using the CEM composite service and complexity scores 
is probably a better choice, since weights are assigned on the basis of professional judgment and 
experience. These alternative estimates suggest that different weights for the service and complexity 
dimensions have a limited impact on the estimation results. Thus, we retain here and later the original 
CEM scores as the variables measuring service quality and business model complexity, having 
                                                 
15 If all observations are pooled, the coefficient of correlation between the original composite service score and 
the weighted average is 0.888, that between the original service score and the first component is 0.966, and that 
between the weighted average and the first component is 0.930. If these coefficients are calculated for country-
specific subsamples, their values remain very high and in most cases exceed 0.900; only three out of 12 
coefficients are below 0.900, and none are below 0.850. `  20 
confidence in the judgment of experts who consider several criteria and place emphasis on the relative 
importance of each dimension. 
 
5.2. Empirical results for the broad definition of output 
Section 5.1 assumes that a pension fund’s services are all related to the process of providing pension 
benefits to its members, where we call the number of participants the narrow measure of output. The 
last column in the upper panel of Table 6 indicates that assets per participant decline systematically 
with pension fund size, when expressed as the number of participants. Apparently, participants and 
total assets are related. More directly, part of the administrative activities may be related to the asset 
portfolio. Therefore, in this subsection we use as an alternative measure the combination of the 
number of participants and total assets (both in logarithms), where the latter is assumed to cover 
administrative costs related to investment management activities: 
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Assuming a multiplicative output model, β1 + β2 < 1 reflects economies of scale, β1 + β2 > 1 
diseconomies of scale, and β1 + β2 = 1 constant returns to scale. To complement the analysis, we also 
apply country-specific interaction terms with, first, the number of participants and, second, total 
assets. Table 9 provides the estimation results of these broad definition specifications. The inclusion of 
total assets may enrich our model, but it reduces the number of available observations by one-quarter. 
For this reason we cannot just compare these outcomes with those in Section 5.1. The variable total 
assets appears to be a significant determinant of administrative costs in the multi-country sample 
(column 1 of Table 9). Apparently, administrative activities and their costs increase somewhat with 
the size of the investment portfolio. The inclusion of total assets reduces the size effect of the number 
of participants with 0.09, so that the sum of these broad definition output coefficients (β1 + β2) is at 
86% somewhat higher than the narrow definition output coefficient (76%). However, this sum is also 
significantly lower than 1 (at the 99% level of confidence), confirming the existence of economies of 
scale. We draw a similar conclusion for the US, be it at the 95% level of confidence (column 3 of 
Table 9). 
 
The inclusion of total assets also affects the coefficients of the other control variables. The service 
quality score is significant, as before, with similar coefficients. The variable single pension plan 
offered, however, is now significant, while the complexity score has lost its significance. Offering of a 
single plan, complexity, and total assets are interrelated, as also appears from their mutual correlation 
coefficients. A single plan is less complex, whereas complexity tends to increase with the financial `  21 
size of the pension fund, as measured by its investment portfolio.
16 The coefficients of the variables 
describing the degree of retirement and inactivity of participants do not differ essentially from those in 
the narrow output definition model. 
 
Table 9. Administrative costs of pension funds explained by a broad definition of the output 
measure 
Value terms (dependent variable administrative costs and explanatory variable total assets) are converted into 
euros and expressed at the 2005 (euro) price level. Asterisks ***, **, and * denote significance from zero at the 
99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively. For the sum of the two scale variables total assets and 
number of participants, we denote “significantly different from one” by degree symbols (º) instead of asterisks 
(see the first row). The Huber–White standard deviations correct for heteroskedasticity and are reported in 
parentheses. 
  Multi-country sample  US 
a 
Number of participants (in logs)  ***/ººº0.671 (0.072)  ***/ººº0.631 (0.090)
Total assets (in logs)  ***0.188 (0.054)  ***0.231 (0.062)
Standardized CEM service quality score  **0.064 (0.030)  **0.060 (0.024) 
Standardized CEM complexity score  0.030 (0.031)  0.052 (0.037) 
Single pension plan offered  ***-0.231 (0.084)  **-0.198 (0.094) 
Share of retired participants (%)   -0.000 (0.006)  0.003 (0.009) 
Share of deferred participants (%)  ***-0.013 (0.004)  ***-0.014 (0.005) 
Public sector: national government  -0.030 (0.079)  0.041 (0.157) 
Public sector: state or provincial government  **0.523 (0.229)  ***0.673 (0.236) 
Public sector: municipality  **0.201 (0.084)  ***0.286 (0.083) 
Collective agreement (CA): teacher  ***-0.260 (0.089)  ***-0.287 (0.091) 
CA: other school employees  -0.081 (0.062)  -0.077 (0.056) 
CA: police and other public safety workers  0.008 (0.039)  0.001 (0.038) 
Collective agreement: other  **-0.198 (0.777)  ***-0.255 (0.806) 
Corporate pension fund  -0.093 (0.111)   
Industry pension fund  *-0.196 (0.103)   
Australian pension fund  ***0.696 (0.188)   
Canadian pension fund  **0.269 (0.132)   
Dutch pension fund  ***0.629 (0.138)   
Intercept  ***4.112 (0.961)  ***3.474* (1.084) 
Number of observations  189  125 
χ
2 statistic
b  531.5  292.8 
R
2, overall  88.8  88.6 
a The US does not have pension funds in the corporate and industry pension fund categories, so these dummies variables have 
been dropped. 
b Joint significance of coefficients. 
 
The pension fund type dummy coefficients hardly change: Only the significance level of the teacher 
pension fund category is now higher, the reason being that it has, on average, a larger investment 
portfolio, which is now incorporated in the model by the variable total assets itself. The country 
dummy coefficients have values similar to the ones cited before, but they depend strongly on the 
assumed multi-country scale effect: They become insignificant when the two scale parameters are 
country specific.
17 The results for the US are similar to the multi-country outcomes. The goodness of 
                                                 
16 Note that complexity and the number of participants are also strongly correlated at 0.4, but this is less than the 
complexity and total assets correlation of 0.6.  
17 In that case, the country-specific effects of total assets would be insignificant, apart for the US. `  22 
fit is high, at more than 88%. The additional explanatory variable total assets increases this measure 
by roughly 5%. 
 
5.3. A disaggregated cost model 
As mentioned, so far the models investigate total administrative costs. A similar analysis is carried out 
at the micro level of cost components to analyze more in detail for which cost types we observe 
economies of scale. The disaggregated analysis includes all 24 cost types described in the Appendix, 
except those related to (1) disabled and other premium exceptions and (2) compliance with the Dutch 
pension fund supervisor’s regulations, because only the 33 Dutch observations face these costs.
18 The 
model being estimated is equivalent to that of Equation (1), but now each cost type is analyzed 
separately.
19 In addition, for 12 of the remaining 22 administrative activities, we possess information 
on the service quality of that specific activity. 
 
The idiosyncratic errors of Equation (1) applied to disaggregated activity p, εijtp, are likely to be 
correlated with those of the other activities: If a shock hits one activity, other activities are likely 
affected too. This suggests that a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) would increase the efficiency 
of the estimation. However, we instead run 22 separate regressions for two reasons: First, the SUR 
unbalanced panel estimator developed by Biørn (2004) uses a stepwise maximum likelihood 
procedure that does not converge in our estimation. Second, the number of observations across types 
of administrative costs is not the same; thus, the sample size would be sensibly reduced if all 
regressions were to be estimated through SUR. In short, the separate models produce unbiased and 
consistent results that might, however, not be efficient. 
 
Table 10 presents the results for the 22 disaggregated administrative cost components. Here we show 
only the country-specific output coefficient βi from Equation (1) and the test results of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient of the interaction term between the pension fund size and the country 
dummy variable is different from one, using asterisks. For most activities, there is evidence of 
economies of scale in at least one country, although we observe considerable variations in size. 
Significant economies of scale are most frequent for administrative activities in the Netherlands and 
the US. In addition, the average values per country, shown in the last row, clearly show that 
economies of scale are largest in these two countries. This finding is in line with what our 
                                                 
18 The 22 activity-specific costs, listed in Table 10 and indicated by activity type number p, are investigated, 
except for the two pure Dutch activities (p = 23 and 24). Activity-specific weighted service scores are used as 
explanatory variables in the activity-specific costs models when available, which is the case for p = 8, 9, 10, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 (apart from 23 and 24), whereas aggregated averages are included otherwise.  
19 But with interaction terms between the pension fund’s country and its size, assuming again that the impact of 
all other variables on administrative cost components is the same regardless of the country wherein the pension 
fund operates. The results for the more simple specification with a single output variable for all countries are 
essentially the same. White standard deviations are calculated to adjust for heteroskedasticity. `  23 
observations above, but the limited occurrence of economies of scale on a disaggregated level for 
Australia is remarkable, since we do find significant scale economies on the aggregated level. Most 
economies of scale are found for marketing and public relations and financial control with significant 
effects in three countries and as well as in board consulting, rules interpretation, and designing new 
rules, with significant effects in two countries. For almost any given administrative activity, pension 
funds in some of the countries are already operating at their optimal size (or close to it), while in other 
countries they are operating inefficiently, either because they are too large or too small. 
 
Table 10. Economies of scale in the 22 activity-specific costs 
The significance of output coefficients different from one (not zero, as elsewhere) are indicated with ***, **, 
and *, denoting the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
Coefficient β (standard deviation) 
Administrative activities 
Australia  Canada  Netherlands  US 
1. Annuity pension payment  1.24* (0.14) 
°  0.79 (0.18)  0.77** (0.11)  0.88 (0.11) 
2. Pension inceptions  0.97 (0.19)  0.92 (0.21)  1.19*(0.10)  0.81** (0.08) 
3. Benefit estimates  0.61 (0.24)  1.00 (0.25)  0.48** (0.21)  0.78* (0.13) 
4. One-on-one counseling  0.84 (0.35)  1.43 (0.43)  0.43*** (0.18)  0.89 (0.12) 
5. Member presentations  1.05 (0.24)  0.45 (0.46)  0.35*** (0.19)  1.01 (0.18) 
6. Member contacts  0.88 (0.15)  0.99 (0.18)  0.88 (0.10)  0.89 (0.09) 
7. Mass communication  0.89 (0.16)  0.94 (0.24)  0.84 (0.11)  0.74** (0.10) 
8. Data & contributions from employers  0.78 (0.19)  0.74 (0.20)  1.10 (0.11)  0.84 (0.13) 
9. Other data   0.92 (0.53)  0.67 (0.23)  0.74* (0.14)  0.59*** (0.12) 
10. Billing and inspections  0.61 (0.28)  0.35 (0.56)  1.15 (0.14)  0.34*** (0.24) 
11. Service to employers  1.17 (0.37)  1.47* (0.26)  1.11 (0.14)  0.91 (0.11) 
12. Refunds and transfers out  1.08 (0.25)  0.81 (0.17)  0.80 (0.13)  0.71*** (0.11) 
13. Purchases and transfers in  2.50* (0.81)  1.14 (0.27)  0.95 (0.17)  1.11 (0.18) 
14. Assessment of disability pensions  1.04 (0.31)  0.89 (0.70)  1.14 (0.23)  0.90 (0.17) 
15. Board of directors  1.29 (0.24)  1.33 (0.24)  0.75 (0.16)  0.56* (0.24) 
16. Financial control  0.95 (0.19)  0.61** (0.19)  0.62*** (0.10)  0.70** (0.14) 
17. Board consulting  1.19 (0.34)  0.79 (0.42)  0.14*** (0.26)  0.28** (0.30) 
18. Marketing and public relations  0.04*** (0.34)  1.51 (0.58)  0.46*** (0.18)  0.49*** (0.19) 
19. Rules interpretation  0.91 (0.24)  0.67* (0.19)  0.49** (0.22)  0.66*** (0.11) 
20. Design new rules  0.70 (0.20)  0.59** (0.20)  0.58** (0.19)  0.71* (0.18) 
21. Lobbying  0.43 (0.46)  0.93 (0.46)  0.52* (0.25)  0.56* (0.23) 
22. Major projects  0.73 (0.31)  0.36 (0.98)  0.85 (0.18)  1.09 (0.22) 
Average values  0.95 (0.30)  0.88 (0.35) 0.74 (0.16) 0.75 (0.16)
 
On the country level, the Netherlands and the US show the greatest extent of scale economies, while 
(with smaller standard deviations) Australia and Canada shows less room to reduce total costs through 
scale effects. This finding is in line with what our findings for the economies of scale of aggregated 
administrative costs (see column 2 of Table 8). Interestingly, pension funds in the US and the 
Netherlands already tend to be among the cheapest and largest in the sample (see Table 3), yet most 
economies of scale can be found in these countries. 
 
Analyzing the 22 models for the other coefficients, we find few consistent results across cost 
components. Service quality and business model complexity show fewer significant relations, but all 
those that are significant have a positive coefficient, in line with expectations. On the other hand, there `  24 
is greater heterogeneity when considering the impact of different kinds of occupational activities, 
membership composition, and country-specific factors on administrative costs. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The administrative costs of pension funds are very important, for both sponsors and employees, since 
they may erode the wealth accrued for retirement. This study aims to shed light on a number of 
important questions related to the administrative costs of pension funds in four countries with well-
developed pension systems. It explores whether economies of scale in pension fund administration 
exist, measures the impact on administrative costs of service quality and the complexity of the pension 
plan, and analyzes the impact of other cost determinants. 
 
As expected, we find strong evidence of economies of scale, similar to those found in earlier studies, 
such as James et al. (2001), Tapia and Yermo (2008), and Bikker and de Dreu (2009). Overall, a 1% 
increase in the number of participants would increase costs by 0.76%. In the case where total assets 
are included in the model as a second output measure, costs would rise by 0.86% for a size increase of 
1% for both the number of participants and the amount of total assets. When we allow for country-
specific scale effects, that is: different production processes across countries, we observe strong 
evidence of economies of scale for three out of four countries—Australia, the Netherlands, and the 
US—while constant returns to scale cannot be rejected for Canada. The scope for exploiting 
economies of scale is greatest for pension funds in the Netherlands and the US, even though these 
countries’ pension funds already tend to be the largest and cheapest in the sample and their average 
administration costs are small relative to country-wide numbers (see, e.g., OECD, 2009a). Particularly 
for the Netherlands and the US, this outcome is confirmed when our model is applied on 
disaggregated administrative activities. Average costs per participants, both for our aggregated and 
disaggregated administrative activities, indicate a U-shape pattern, suggesting the existence of an 
optimal scale. However, when our model is based on the aggregated data, we do not find a statistically 
significant nonlinear effect. The results of this study support actions aimed at improving the efficiency 
of pension funds by consolidation, but not necessarily for very large pension funds. Note that all 
conclusions in this paper are under the reservation that our sample may not be fully representative of 
the countries’ entire pension sectors. 
 
Scale economy estimates could be biased when smaller pension funds systematically offer a more 
personalized service. Our dataset allows us to test such a bias, since we have data on complexity and 
service quality. First, we observe that smaller funds do tend to provide fewer rather than more 
services, while their pension plans are also are less complex, which does not point to tailor-made 
pensions. Apparently, the cost inefficiencies of smaller funds are not explained by higher service `  25 
quality or cut-to-size pensions. This conclusion regards our sample, which underrepresents the 
smallest pension funds. Second, we include complexity and service quality as control variables in our 
administrative costs model and find that both complexity and service quality significantly increase 
administrative costs, as expected. Furthermore, we find that offering only one policy plan substantially 
decreases administrative costs. Both complexity and service quality are associated with costs, but the 
question is what pension plan members would select if they have a choice between higher service 
quality and more tailor-made options on the one hand and lower costs on the other. 
 
Administrative costs vary significantly across types of pension funds. Pension funds for, for example, 
employees of state or provincial governments have a remarkable 70% higher level of administrative 
costs, and those for municipalities 10%, other things being equal, while the costs for teacher and other 
(mainly non-public sector) pension funds have costs that are around 20% lower, all percentages being 
statistically significant. This finding points to huge potentials for efficiency improvements, on top of 
those stemming from consolidation. Finally, if we take all considered cost determinants into account, 
including country-specific scale economies, we do not observe any remaining cost difference across 
the four countries investigated. Hence, where the Dutch pension funds in our sample have, on average, 
relatively low administration costs, these are attributable to their larger scale, larger share of less 
costly deferred participants, and lower frequency of complex pension plans. 
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Appendix: Costs of specific administrative activities 
 
The dataset includes information on the costs of specific administrative activities. To investigate the 
relation between size, service quality, complexity, and administrative costs, the latter are 
disaggregated into 24 different subcategories of activities: 1) annuity pension payments, 2) pension 
inceptions, 3) benefit estimates, 4) one-on-one counseling, 5) group presentations to members, 6) 
member contacts through mail, phone, and e-mail, 7) mass communication, 8) collection of data about 
and contributions from members via employers, 9) collection of data not via employers, 10) billing 
and inspections, 11) services to employers, 12) refunds and transfers out of individual pension 
accounts, 13) purchases and transfers in of individual pension accounts, 14) assessment of disability 
pensions, 15) the board of directors, 16) financial control, 17) board consulting, 18) marketing and 
public relations, 19) rules interpretation, 20) the design of new rules, 21) lobbying, 22) major projects, 
and—only for the Netherlands—23) disabled and other premium exceptions and 24) compliance with 
the supervisory regulations, that is, the regulations of the Central Bank of the Netherlands (DNB). 
While the sum of these types of administrative costs should equal total costs, in practice there are 
small discrepancies due to the way in which the data are collected. Besides, some of the pension funds 
(or some countries) in the sample either do not report or do not face certain administrative costs. 
 
Table A.1 shows the average administrative costs over observations for each activity type, as well as 
across size classes, based on the number of participants.
20 Note that detailed data are not available for 
all 254 pension fund–year observations. For most categories, there is a clear U-shaped curve, with 
average costs first declining with size and then increasing again, pointing to, respectively, economies 
and diseconomies of scale. In most cases (54%), the minimum efficient scale is in the class of pension 
funds having between 500,000 and 1,000,000 members (see bold numbers in Table A.1). This follows 
also from the total administrative costs, the totals shown in the last row. For three categories (13%), 
lowest average costs are obtained for the smaller class of 100-500 thousand participants. In some 
instances (33%), average costs seem to diminish continuously, since the class size increases without 
any subsequent rise. In addition, in a few categories there is less regular relation between average 
costs and class size. Lastly, Table A.1 shows the incidence of different types of costs on the total 
administrative cost.
21 In this respect, we observe heterogeneity across categories. Costs related to core 
business activities (annuity pension payment, pension inceptions, and data and contribution 
collection), individual and mass communication with members, financial control, and major projects 
are the main expenditure categories. At the opposite end, group presentations to members, board 
                                                 
20 The weighted average costs of administrative activities are defined as Σn wnCin, with Cin the administrative 
costs of activity i for pension fund n. The weight of pension fund n, wn, is defined as pn /Σn pn, with pn the number 
of participants of pension fund n. 
21 Weighted average incidence of different activities on total administrative cost is defined as Σn wnCin /ACn, with 
ACn the total administrative cost of pension fund n. `  28 
consulting, marketing and public relations, and rule interpretation and design have the lowest 
incidence. These figures are important because economies of scale, to have a substantial impact on 
total administrative costs, should exist in activities that have a relative high incidence on total costs. 
 
Table A.1. Costs of 24 administrative activities by five pension fund size classes. 
For each cost category, the lowest average costs number is printed in bold. 
Average administrative cost per participant (in euros) by 











1,000,000  >1,000,000  Total 
Weighted average 




Annuity pension payment  250         9.2        4.1       4.3              3.0  2.5  3.3 6.0 
Pension inceptions   250  10.6  6.6  5.0              5.0  5.1  5.1 9.6 
Benefit estimates   247  4.6  3.2  2.8  1.2  1.2  1.8 3.3 
One-on-one counseling   236  8.0  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.3  1.7 2.9 
Member presentations  135  3.0  0.4  1.1  0.6  0.6  0.8 0.6 
Member contacts  254  12.3  7.0  6.1  4.4  3.9  4.9 9.3 
Mass communication  254  13.0  5.9  4.6  2.2  3.3  3.5 6.4 
Data and contributions 
from employers 
250  9.3  7.0  5.5  4.1  5.2  5.0 9.8 
Data not from employers  234  6.5  2.8  1.4  1.6  2.0  1.7 3.5 
Billing and inspections  211  1.3  1.4  0.5  0.9  1.4  1.0 2.0 
Service to employers  230  1.7  2.9  1.9  1.3  2.7  1.9 3.8 
Refunds and transfers out  254  10.7  4.0  3.2  1.3  1.8  2.2 3.9 
Purchases & transfers in  241  5.7  5.1  3.2  2.4  2.9  2.9 4.8 
Assessment of disability 
pensions 
225  8.0  2.7  3.5  2.4  4.1  3.3 5.0 
Board of directors  238  10.4  4.3  2.3  0.8  1.1  1.6 2.9 
Financial control  254  23.2  9.9  4.2  2.3  4.5  3.9 6.8 
Board consulting  216  6.7  1.5  1.3  1.3  0.3  1.0 1.5 
Marketing & public relat.  158  2.4  1.4  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.5 0.6 
Rule interpretation  238  5.5  2.5  1.3  1.3  0.8  1.2 2.2 
Design new rules  218  3.7  1.4  1.0  0.8  1.0  1.0 1.4 
Lobbying  183  2.1  0.9  0.8  0.3  0.4  0.5 0.7 
Major projects  203  18.8  12.9  9.1  7.5  11.3  9.2 13.1 
Disability and other 
premium exceptions
c 
33  1.4  1.2  0.7  0.4  0.6  0.6 – 
Compliance to DNB reg.
c  33  4.0  3.1  0.7  0.6  0.2  0.4 – 
Total 
d    168  86  62  44  54  55 100.0 
a Excluding observations for which the cost is zero. 
b The weighted average incidence is calculated excluding the costs of disability and premium exceptions and that of 
compliance with DNB regulations, because only Dutch pension funds face these types of cost. The numbers, however, are 
essentially the same if two costs are included. 
c Only for Dutch pension funds (excluded in the panel analysis). 
d The size class totals result from weighting with the respective numbers of observations divided by 250. They compare to the 
figures in the second column of the upper panel of Table 6, denoting the administrative cost per participant. 
 
 